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MAR 2 3 1990

Jeoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Jensen v. DeLand
No. 870107

Dear Mr. Butler:
This letter is written in response to the Courtfs invitation
of March 8, 1990 to reply to the Petition for Rehearing filed by
the State in the above-captioned case. Because this response is
extremely succinct Appellant requests that this letter be
circulated among the justices of this Court in lieu of a formally
bound reply as is normally contemplated for the average length
response.
Appellant concurs with the State that the present system does
not provide an adequate opportunity to raise ineffective counsel
in the lower court during the appellate proceedings. This
reaction causes a defendant in a criminal case to essentially rely
upon a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing many months or years
later to litigate the claim. Such a method is a great detriment
to an incarcerated defendant as well as to the availability of
evidence concerning the conduct of counsel which during the habeas
corpus proceedings could have occurred years before.
Appellant's counsel believes that this issue as to a means of
solving the present problem deserves careful attention either by
granting a rehearing in the instant case to allow the parties to
find various options available to this Court or to request that
the rules committee formulate a new procedure for this Court and
the Court of Appeals. Special concern should be directed to those
cases in which counsel represents the defendant both at trial and
on appeal since the ability to raise ineffectiveness of counsel is
naturally virtually eliminated in such cases. Appellant would
therefore be pleased to reopen this case for the express purpose
of determining a procedure to solve problems such as this one for
future cases.
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It is assumed that Appellant in this case will be entitled to
a hearing based upon the original opinion of this Court as to his
claim of ineffective counsel either in a habeas corpus setting or
in an evidentiary setting as now being proposed. Appellant wishes
to insure that his rights to a full hearing will not be
compromised by any new procedure which is developed by this Court
pursuant to the Statefs request. In addition, Appellant in his
own Petition for Rehearing has requested that the scope of the
issues to be examined in an evidentiary hearing be expanded to
include the question of prosecutional misconduct. This argument
is set forth in Appellantfs own Petition for Rehearing.
Appellant also disagrees with one statement contained in the
Petition for Rehearing filed by the State. The State likens the
defendant in the Hafen case to that of the instant defendant.
The State makes the following assertion:
Here, defendant knew of the ineffectiveness issues
and requested his appellate counsel to raise them on
appeal. As in Hafen, Defendant's appellate counsel
did not honor his request. Defendant remained silent as
did Hafen. No "unusual circumstances" exist in the
present case beyond those found insufficient in Hafen
to preclude application of the procedural waiver rule.
State's Petition for Rehearing, p. 6.
This statement is in error for two reasons. First, in Hafen
the defendant's attorney on appeal was the same attorney who
represented him in trial. In the instant case two separate
attorneys were appointed. Second, and most importantly, the
instant defendant did not remain silent as to his appellate
counsel's failure to raise issues but in fact wrote several
letters of concern and requested an affidavit from his appellate
counsel stating these concerns. It is hard to imagine what other
actions an incarcerated defendant could take if he was not
satisfied with the appeal being written by his newly appointed
appellate counsel.
Finally, the question as to the voluntary waiver raised by
the State in its Petition for Rehearing (pp. 6-7) again requires
extensive analysis since what is just and proper in one type of
case would not be in another. For example, it is unfair to expect
a criminal defendant to be able to ascertain his counsel's
ineffectiveness especially if that counsel has represented him in
both the trial and the appeal. In that context a defendant may
well not be aware that he is waiving any claim of ineffectiveness
until a post-conviction proceeding in which new counsel has been
appointed. These are matters which should be addressed in
resolving the entire complex problem now existing.
In summary, Appellant's counsel will fully cooperate with
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this Court in any inquiry which it deems relevant to the State's
proposed solution to the ineffective counsel problem since such
solution will ultimately effect numerous defendants each year. On
the other hand, however, Appellant is entitled to a speedy and
expeditious proceeding in one form or the other as to his claim
that he has been illegally incarcerated. For this reason,
therefore, regardless of the outcome of the procedural inquiry
requested by the State Appellant should be allowed to have an
immediate hearing so that his particular case does not further
languish.
Respectfully submitted,

Craig S (J Cook
Attorney for Appellant
CSC:kd
cc:

Dan R. Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Richard L. Jensen
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84070
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